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Collective decisions can emerge from individual-level interactions
between members of a group. These interactions are often seen
as social feedback rules, whereby individuals copy the decisions
they observe others making, creating a coherent group decision.
The benefit of these behavioral rules to the individual agent
can be understood as a transfer of information, whereby a focal
individual learns about the world by gaining access to the infor-
mation possessed by others. Previous studies have analyzed this
exchange of information by assuming that all agents share com-
mon goals. While differences in information and differences in
preferences have often been conflated, little is known about how
differences between agents’ underlying preferences affect the
use and efficacy of social information. In this paper, I develop a
model of social information use by rational agents with differing
preferences, and demonstrate that the resulting collective behav-
ior is strongly dependent on the structure of preference sharing
within the group, as well as the quality of information in the
environment. In particular, I show that strong social responses are
expected by individuals that are habituated to noisy, uncertain
environments where private information about the world is rela-
tively weak. Furthermore, by investigating heterogeneous group
structures, I demonstrate a potential influence of cryptic minor-
ity subgroups that may illuminate the empirical link between
personality and leadership.
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The choices made by others serve as a conduit for informationabout the world that other individuals possess, and therefore
enable a focal individual to make decisions with greater expected
utility or fitness than they could do alone. This transmission
of information, frequently labeled as “social information,” has
been posited as an important factor driving collective cohesion
in animal and human groups (1–3), alongside other benefits of
aggregation such as dilution of predation risk (4).
The tendency of individuals to follow the decisions of others
has been comprehensively demonstrated across many taxa [e.g.,
insects (5), fish (6, 7), birds (8, 9), and mammals (10–12),
including humans (13, 14)]. Many studies have posited simple
social feedback rules as models for collective decision-making,
demonstrating how individual behavioral heuristics could gen-
erate cohesive collective decisions (15–17). Other studies have
sought to reveal the form of these social interaction rules via a
data-driven approach (5, 18). However, neither of these meth-
ods identify the source of the behavioral rules in terms of the
direct benefit to the individual, an important evolutionary princi-
ple in unrelated groups (19). More recent work has investigated
how social interaction rules could be justified from the ratio-
nal self-interest of the decision-making agents, either through
an evolutionary analysis (20) or by direct calculation (1–3).
Identifying the individual fitness or utility motivations of social
interactions is important for understanding how behavior will
vary with context, and thus how to extrapolate from empirical
observations to make predictions about social behavior in other
environments (3).
Studies that have sought to directly evaluate rational rules of
social interaction (1–3) have addressed the fundamental ques-
tion of social information: What can one individual learn by
observing the choices made by others? The general approach
to this question has centered on two conceptual points: 1) The
choices of other agents are of interest because those agents have
information that the focal individual may lack; and 2) the focal
agent can only infer what that information might be by consid-
ering why the other agent made the choice it did. In considering
why another agent may have made the choice they did, the focal
agent must have a model for how that agent responds to dif-
ferent information. A simple model is to assume that the other
agent is identical to oneself, and therefore responds identically to
any set of information (3). However, groups are not, in general,
composed of identical individuals, and agents may have different
preferences based on their particular needs or tastes. This may
be the case within same-species groups, as individuals can differ
in, for example, age, genetic profile (21), or current nutritional
needs. Even more clearly, groups may be composed of multiple
species (8, 22), with potentially very different needs and goals
between individuals from different species.
How then might agents make use of social information when
their preferences differ? It is important here to distinguish
between differences in preference and differences in informa-
tion. Information and preference differences are frequently con-
flated in models inspired by physical systems, where both are
typically expressed in terms of attractive forces or potentials
(e.g., refs. 23–26), but, in reality, these are different sources
of possible conflict, with quite different effects upon a ratio-
nal agent. Consider two individuals, one of which is trained to
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associate food with red markings, the other with blue mark-
ings. This may result in a difference in revealed color preference
between them when both markings are displayed. However, this
color preference is, from a rational perspective, a cipher for both
individuals’ common preference for food. It is therefore better
understood as a difference of information: The two individuals
may differ in where they believe food to be located, but both
still share a desire to find the food, and should therefore be
interested in what the other knows. Conversely, two individuals
with exactly the same information may make different choices
if they have different goals, and be entirely uninterested in the
choices each other makes—for example, a vegetarian and a com-
mitted carnivore choosing where to eat based on the same set
of restaurant reviews. I have previously considered differences in
information when agents have identical preferences (3), where
agents can view each other as more or less direct proxies in
terms of response to information. Differences in preferences
matter because they change what one individual can learn from
observing another, as the actions of those other agents may be
different than what the focal agent would have done with the
same information.
Here I develop a model for collective decision-making by
rational agents with differing preferences, that seek to maxi-
mize differing utility functions (27). This is based on a model
of utility structured as an array of environmental factors char-
acterizing different choices, which can encode differing degrees
of correlation between individual preferences. Using this frame-
work of utility functions, I then derive the rational decision-
making rules for individuals to follow, assuming that individuals
have common acquired knowledge about the expected range of
environmental characteristics and the typical degree to which
their preferences align. Finally, I derive the expected behav-
ior of the individuals and the group when faced with a binary
decision between two alternatives, A and B, which can repre-
sent different foraging patches, different movement directions,
or any other mutually exclusive activities. Following ref. 3, I
evaluate the expected behavior from the perspective of an exter-
nal observer (as opposed to the agents themselves), and thus
make predictions about the likely characteristics of collective
decision-making seen in empirical studies and in real human and
animal groups.
Results
In this section, I explore the decision-making of rational agents
under a variety of different environmental and social contexts, by
varying several key parameters of the model described in Materi-
als and Methods: 1) the habitual environmental noise level ().
This is the noise to signal ratio in the environment to which
the agent is habituated, and thus represents the agent’s prior
belief regarding the reliability of environmental information—
note that all agents are assumed to share the same belief about
this environmental noise level; 2) the experimental noise level, η.
This is the noise to signal ratio under which the agents are being
observed, and will typically be lower than  in laboratory exper-
iments; and 3) the magnitude and structure of the correlation
between agent preferences ρ. Agents with similar preferences
have high values of ρ, while strongly dissimilar preferences imply
very low or even negative values of ρ. All of these parameters are
discussed in more detail in Materials and Methods.
Differing Preferences Induce Environmental Dependence in Decision-
Making. I evaluated the probability that a focal individual will
choose option A, under natural conditions where the experimen-
tal noise level (η) matches the habitual environmental noise level
(), conditioned on different sequences of previous decisions,
and within a group where individual preferences have a charac-
teristic correlation ρ. I further calculated how these probabilities
varied with the habitual environmental noise level . The results
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Fig. 1. The probability for a focal agent to choose option A, conditioned
on possible sequences of previously observed decisions by up to three
other individuals, across a range of environmental noise levels, with (A)
weakly aligned preferences (ρ = 0.5) or (B) strongly aligned preferences
(ρ = 0.9).
of these calculations are shown in Fig. 1, with each line corre-
sponding to a different sequence of up to three previous deci-
sions. Each line is labeled by the sequence of previous decisions
in chronological order; for example, AAB represents the case
where the most recent observed choice was B, preceded by two
agents choosing A. Fig. 1A and Fig. 1B correspond to different
degrees of preference alignment (ρ) between individuals. These
results demonstrate a strong dependence of social influence on
the habitual environmental noise level. For relatively low pref-
erence alignment (ρ=0.5, Fig. 1A), increasing the noise level 
has the effect of increasing the tendency for the focal individ-
ual to follow the majority of previous decision makers. When the
environmental noise level is low, social responses are very weak,
and individuals tend to follow their own private information. In
the second case where preferences are highly aligned (ρ=0.9,
Fig. 1B), the response to social information is strengthened
across the range of , but an interesting secondary effect is seen
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in addition to this general trend: As the noise level  is increased,
there is a transition from weakly following the majority opinion
to strongly following the most recent decisions in cases where
the most recent decision conflicts with the majority. This can be
seen clearly in the crossing of the lines representing the decision
sequences AAB and BBA in Fig. 1B. A complementary effect
can be observed for the sequences AAB, ABA and BAA: Here
the sequence of previous decisions makes a substantial differ-
ence to the focal agent’s decision when the environmental noise
level is high, but, when the environmental noise is low, all three
cases converge to the same decision probability. These results
should be compared with those of ref. 3, which correspond to the
special case of ρ=1. In that case, there is no dependence on envi-
ronmental noise levels, and the most recent decision is always
favored.
Relative Social Weighting. The theory described in Materials and
Methods results in a complex, recursive decision-making rule.
However, a simpler perspective on the importance of the model
parameters can be obtained if one focuses only on the deci-
sion faced by the second individual, who must balance the
social information provided by the first decision against their
own private information. How are these sources of information
weighted? One can see from Eq. 12 that the private informa-
tion of agent 2 enters in the second term, weighted by a factor
of 1/, while the social information is contained in the third
term and weighted by ρ/
√
1+ 2− ρ2. From the ratio of these
two weightings, we can define the “relative social weighting”
(RSW),
RSW= ρ/
√
1+ 2− ρ2. [1]
This relationship contains several important special cases. When
individuals share identical preferences (ρ=1), the choices made
by others are a direct proxy for the decision the focal agent would
have made themselves, and thus the RSW is one. When prefer-
ences are not identical (ρ< 1), private information dominates
in cases where that information is reliable (<< 1), and thus
the RSW is close to zero. However, when private information
is not reliable (>> 1), the choices of others are weighted in
proportion to how strongly preferences are aligned (RSW ' ρ).
If there is no correlation between two individuals’ utility func-
tions (ρ=0), then the choices made by one convey no social
information to the other, and the RSW is zero. If ρ is nega-
tive, then agents have opposed preferences, and the resulting
RSW is negative, implying that one agent will actively disfa-
vor the option chosen by the other. Note that a homogeneous
value of ρ below zero is not possible in groups of more than
two agents.
Sequence Ordering in Previous Decisions. I investigated further
how preference alignment and environmental noise determine
how a focal individual uses social information, focusing on the
possible tension between a majority of previous decisions and
the most recent of those decisions. To explore this tension, I
consider a simple conflict: a sequence of previous decisions of
the form BBA. That is, the focal individual is presented with two
previous decisions in favor of B, followed by one in favor of A,
such that the majority of previous decisions favor B, but the most
recent social information favors A. For a range of values of  and
ρ, and for two different experimental conditions η, I calculated
the probability that the focal individual will choose option A. The
results, shown in Fig. 2, indicate a consistent pattern for resolving
this conflict. When tested under naturalistic conditions (η/=1,
Fig 2A) individuals that are habituated to a noisy environment
and have a high degree of preference alignment are more likely
to follow the most recent decision maker. Conversely, individu-
als that are habituated to low-noise environments and/or have a
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Fig. 2. Resolving conflicts between majority decisions and recent decisions.
(A) The probability that a focal individual will select option A, conditioned
on observing three previous decisions of the form BBA, as a function of
the utility function correlation and the environmental noise level, tested
under natural conditions η/ = 1). (B) The equivalent probabilities, assuming
the focal individual is tested under low-noise laboratory conditions (η/ =
1/2). In both cases, the focal agent favors recent information when utility
alignment is strong and environmental noise is high. (C) The results for the
natural setting (black points) and the laboratory setting (red points) plotted
against the RSW.
low degree of preference alignment are more likely to follow the
majority. The white contour line indicates where either outcome
is equally likely, that is, the agent follows the most recent decision
50% of the time. This effect is amplified by low-noise experi-
mental conditions (e.g., η/=1/2, Fig. 2B), but the transition
contour of P(A)= 0.5 remains consistent across the different
experimental treatments. In Fig. 2C, the probability to choose
A is plotted against the RSW defined above, showing that this
combination of ρ and  explains much of the variation in the
decision probability, with the most recent decision being favored
when the RSW is above approximately 0.5. Since strong social
response also depends on a high value of the RSW, this means
that groups are likely to exhibit either a strong response to recent
social information or a weaker response to the majority. Note
that, for very low environmental noise levels, the probability of
following the most recent decision returns to 0.5, since, in this
case, there is very little social influence, and individual decisions
are independent.
RSW Drives Consensus. Having determined that preference align-
ment and environmental noise have a strong effect on how a
focal individual makes use of social information, we need to
understand the consequences of this for collective behavior. Of
particular interest is the degree to which groups can come to
consensus decisions and remain cohesive.
Assuming a group of eight individuals making sequential
choices according to the rational decision-making rule, I eval-
uated the probability for each possible collective outcome in the
binary decision-making scenario, in terms of the eventual num-
ber of individuals selecting option A, nA, and those choosing
option B, nB . This calculation considered the probability of every
sequence of decisions that could give rise to a given collective
10390 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2000840117 Mann
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Fig. 3. Expected group consensus as a function of environmental noise
and utility correlation for eight agents tested under (A) naturalistic condi-
tions (η/= 1) and (B) low-noise laboratory conditions (η/= 1/2). (C) The
expected consensus for naturalistic (black points) and laboratory (red points)
conditions as a function of the RSW. Consensus is strong when RSW is high
and is enhanced by low-noise experimental conditions.
outcome and summed over these to give the final probabilities.
Each of these collective outcomes is given a “consensus score,”
defined as
consensus=
|nA−nB |
nA+nB
, [2]
such that a consensus score of one indicates that all individuals
chose the same option, and a consensus score of zero indicates
an equal split between A and B.
I performed this calculation for the same range of environ-
mental noise levels, preference alignments, and experimental
conditions as in the analysis of sequence ordering above. The
results, shown in Fig. 3, demonstrate that consensus depends
strongly on these factors. When individuals are habituated to
a noisy environment or have strongly aligned preferences, then
the group tends to come to a consensus decision, with a high
consensus score under these conditions and in the naturalistic
experimental environment (η/=1, Fig. 3A). Conversely, con-
sensus scores are low when the habitual environment has little
noise, or when preferences have very low alignment. Low-noise
experimental conditions (η/=1/2) create greater consensus for
any given values of ρ and  (Fig. 3B); this effect of experimen-
tal noise is in line with those explored in ref. 3. In Fig. 3C,
the expected consensus score for each experimental condition is
plotted as a function of the RSW (black points for the η/=1,
red points for η/=1/2). Here one can see that RSW explains
almost all of the variation in consensus as a function of ρ and .
In this experiment, agents made decisions once, in an ordered
sequence. If agents are allowed to revise their choices after see-
ing the choices made by all others, this will, in general, lead to
greater consensus values. For agents with identical preferences
(ρ=1), this iterative process must eventually lead to perfect
consensus by virtue of Aumann’s agreement theorem (28). For
value of ρ below one, persistent disagreement is possible, but
allowing agents to revise their choices nonetheless typically leads
to greater consensus. Therefore, this should not be seen as
a precise prediction of the quantitative degree of consensus
in groups, but rather a demonstration of how consensus levels
vary with environmental and experimental noise and preference
alignment.
The Effect of Cryptic Group Substructures. The analysis, so far,
has looked at the behavior of groups from a population that
is undifferentiated, having a fixed utility correlation between
any pair of individuals. Now I consider a group drawn from a
population with further substructure: the existence of two dis-
tinct types of individual, α and β. I assume that individuals
of the same type share a high correlation between their utility
functions, whereas individuals of differing types have a low cor-
relation. Furthermore, I assume that these individual types are
cryptic, that is, they are not directly observable by other indi-
viduals, except through decision-making behavior. To illustrate
the relevance of such a structure, consider a population with
two distinct genotypes, with the result that individuals with each
genotype require different relative amounts of carbohydrate and
protein, but where the genotype has no other, directly perceiv-
able phenotypic effect. In such a population, we would expect the
interactions between individuals to reflect the reality that some
conspecifics more closely share their nutritional preferences than
others.
First, I consider a population of two equally numerous types,
with those of a given type having identical preferences (ρ=1),
and individuals of differing types having no correlation in their
utility function (ρ=0). I calculated the probability that a focal
decision maker of type α will choose option A conditional on
a variety of possible sequences of previous decisions, and for
a range of possible environmental noise levels (by symmetry,
the results are the same for a focal individual of either type).
These probabilities are shown in Fig. 4A. These results show a
superposition of two different responses to environmental noise.
In the cases where all previous decision makers have made the
same choice, the probability for the focal individual to choose
A changes little with environmental noise. This pattern is close
to that seen for agents with identical preferences (see ref. 3
and Fig. 1). However, in cases where previous decisions have
not been unanimous, there is a strong dependence on the envi-
ronmental noise, resembling that seen in Fig. 1A. The intuition
behind this superposition is that, when a focal agent observes
all previous decision makers in agreement, they conclude that
it is likely they are all of the same type, and thus share iden-
tical preferences. Conversely, observing disagreement implies a
high probability that the previous decision makers were of dif-
fering types. The consequences of this are particularly striking
for the case of low environmental noise: In such environments,
social influence is relatively low, except in the case of unanimity.
That is, the difference between a unanimous set of previous deci-
sions compared to a majority is qualitative rather than merely
quantitative.
In the example above, the two distinct types were equally
prevalent in the population as a whole. In general, this will
not be the case: Frequency-dependent evolution can select for
substantially unequal proportions of differing types of individ-
ual (e.g., ref. 20). What is the effect of such an imbalance on
social behavior? I considered a population composed of 90%
type α individuals and 10% type β, where ρα,α= ρβ,β =0.9 and
ρα,β =0.25. I calculated the probability for a focal agent of either
type to choose option A, based on the same set of putative pre-
vious decision sequences as in the previous example. The results
for an individual of the majority type α are shown in Fig. 4B,
and those for an individual of the minority type β are shown in
Fig. 4C. From these plots, one can see a substantial difference in
the social behavior of the two types of individual: Type α individ-
uals display strong social responses close to those of individuals
in an undifferentiated and strongly aligned population (Fig. 1B),
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Fig. 4. Scenarios with cryptic group substructures. (A) The probability for
a focal individual to choose option A as in Fig. 1, when individuals are
drawn from a population of two equally prevalent subtypes with identi-
cal within-type preferences and zero between-type correlation. (B and C)
The equivalent probabilities for individuals of the (B) majority type and (C)
minority type in the case where 90% of individuals are of the majority type,
with high within-type utility alignment (ρ= 0.9) and low between-type
correlation (ρ= 0.25).
while type β individuals have a weak social response similar to
those from an undifferentiated and weakly aligned population
(Fig. 1A). This difference arises from the different utility corre-
lation between individuals of each type and the population as a
whole: Those in the majority can assume that most other indi-
viduals have closely aligned preferences and therefore are worth
following, while those in the minority understand that most other
individuals have differing preferences and therefore convey little
useful social information.
Discussion
In this paper, I have described a model of collective decision-
making by rational individuals with differing preferences, utility
functions, or fitness outcomes when faced with decisions that
depend on many factors. Developing this model has focused
attention on precisely how the choices of one individual con-
vey information about the likely utility of possible options
to another individual, and when that information is likely
to be reliable. This model goes beyond previous efforts to
understand the foundations of social information by remov-
ing any assumption that individuals are identical, while distin-
guishing between differences in knowledge and differences of
preference.
The calculations performed by rational agents in this model
are complex and require making inferences about the inferences
made by all other observed agents, in a known sequence of
actions. Even in relatively small groups, this would be extremely
cognitively demanding for any organism. Furthermore, the
restriction to a single well-ordered sequence of actions is unreal-
istic for many real-world collective decisions, where agents may
choose simultaneously and/or repeatedly. The intention of this
model is not to derive the precise rules that real agents will apply,
but to reveal the qualitative features of rational decision-making
that any evolved, heuristic decision-making rule can be expected
to emulate. I expect that cognitively sophisticated organisms will
display behaviors that correspond to more of the fine details
of the rational choice theory (such as sequence-specific behav-
ior), while cognitively simpler organisms may use heuristics that
mimic only the broader patterns seen in these results (such as the
overall degree of sociality).
I have shown that the rational use of social information
depends strongly upon the degree to which the focal decision
maker believes that others share its preferences, with stronger
social interactions between similar agents. This intuitive result
provides an informational basis for several observed tenden-
cies in animal groups, for example, for the observed stronger
social response to conspecifics compared to heterospecifics in
mixed-species bird groups (8, 22), for the tendency of baboons
to follow movements initiated by close social affiliates (29), and
for the preference of true conspecifics over a robotic imitation
in zebrafish (30). It is also likely to contribute to homophily
in human societies, for example, in housing choice (31), where
the presence of many households with similar characteristics to
oneself in an area provides useful information that your own
needs and preferences can be met locally. In this way, collec-
tive patterns such as neighborhood segregation may be driven
by the different information values of other individuals as well
as other explanations such as the dislike of being in a local
minority (32).
The use of social information also depends strongly on the
quality of information from the environment. This, in turn, has
important consequences for the collective behavior of social
groups in different contexts. Different species of animal, for
example, are habituated to widely differing levels of environmen-
tal noise. The same outcomes may have quite different fitness
consequences for different individuals within an animal group.
In human society, too, one finds contexts of varying uncertainty
and agreement over preferences. The model predicts that these
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differing environmental and social contexts will lead to dramat-
ically different social behavior. Previous work has shown that
rational individuals with identical preferences should exhibit sim-
ilar social responsiveness across a wide range of environmental
conditions (3); in a noisy environment, private and social infor-
mation both become less reliable to the same degree, such that
the balance between the two remains constant. Here I have
shown that, when preferences are not identical, this symmetry is
broken. In a low-noise environment, private information is more
trustworthy than social information, since it is not corrupted by
differences in utility function. In a noisy environment, the uncer-
tainty an individual has about others’ preferences is relatively
low compared to the general uncertainty of all information, and
thus the relative strength of social information increases. On
the group level, this should lead to greater consensus in collec-
tive decision-making when individual preferences are strongly
aligned and when uncertainty is high. These results imply that
different species of animal (or the same species habituated
to different environments) will display different social behav-
ior in the wild in a predictable fashion. Groups composed of
individuals habituated to noisier environments should be more
cohesive and responsive to the actions of others. In addition
to a stronger overall social response, I also found that high-
noise environments and strong commonality in preferences led
to a strong order-dependent use of social information, wherein
a focal decision maker was more likely to follow a minority of
recent decisions rather than a majority of preceding ones. This
suggests that recent information will be dominant in cases where
uncertainty about the world is generally high, and where a focal
decision maker can assume that others want the same things as
it does.
As noted in ref. 3, there is comparative ecological evidence
to support the greater social responsiveness of agents habit-
uated to noisier environments. However, this is complicated
by the effect of context dependency where animals have been
tested under conditions that differ from their habitual envi-
ronment, and the effect is likely to be amplified by studies
in the laboratory under common conditions. In common with
earlier predictions by ref. 3, here I found that reducing the
experimental noise level relative to the habitual environmen-
tal level strengthened social response, increased consensus, and
made recent social information more important. Thus, individu-
als transposed from a noisy environment to the laboratory are
subject to the increased sociality imposed by adaptation to a
noisy environment and also the heightened social responsive-
ness from a reduced experimental noise level. There is also
likely to be a strong selection bias in the experimental liter-
ature within the field of collective behavior toward instances
where individuals display strong social interactions. Examples
of trivially nonsocial behavior in low-noise environments, such
as selecting the phone number for a known contact in a tele-
phone directory, are therefore unlikely to be considered for
study. These likely issues with existing experimental and obser-
vational data mean that further comparative studies are needed
to assess how far the predictions in this paper are reflected in real
populations.
Where agents are able to adapt their behavior to a variety of dif-
ferent contexts, one can expect to see individuals change their
social responsiveness as the situation demands. A consequence
of this would likely be to induce strong social feedback and a
high salience for the most recent social information when envi-
ronmental uncertainty is high and individuals transparently share
the same objectives. This is a possible contributing factor in
several examples of destructive herding behavior: Stock mar-
kets consisting of agents with strongly aligned goals (investment
returns) tend to eliminate the value of private information for
most participants (33), leading to high uncertainty for the typi-
cal investor, conducive to bubbles and crashes; crowd disasters
are often associated with situations where individual utilities are
strongly aligned (to escape), as private information becomes less
reliable [e.g., through the presence of smoke (34), or through
alcohol consumption (35)]. While, in these instances, such social
feedback is ultimately maladaptive, such behavior may be the
result of a social heuristic with a rational basis: When private
information is scarce, follow others, especially those similar to
yourself.
The results also demonstrate a potential source of leadership
in heterogeneous groups. Where a group is composed of cryp-
tic subtypes with differing preferences, we should expect those
in the minority group to attend less to social information, and
those in the majority to be more strongly social. On the indi-
vidual level, this may contribute to the consistent differences
in social response observed between individuals in some animal
groups (e.g., refs. 36 and 37). At the group level, it would cre-
ate an emergent leadership role for those in the minority, who
would attend relatively more strongly to environmental cues,
while those in the majority act preferentially as followers and
thus ensure group cohesion. Since cohesive groups can be led by
a relatively small number of relatively less social individuals (20,
23, 25, 38), these minority groups could have a disproportionately
large effect on the collective decision-making. However, rather
than the group being led by a subset of “informed individuals,” in
this model, leadership would be conferred on those with unusual
preferences rather than greater information. Heterogeneity of
preferences could result from genetic or ontogenetic causes,
and one may speculate on whether these may be connected
with “personality” features such as boldness that have been
linked to leadership (9, 39, 40). Conflicting preferences could
also result from transient circumstances such as different hunger
levels, creating “leadership by need” (25). Phenotypic and behav-
ioral heterogeneity plays an important role in how social groups
function (41), and the potential role of minority-preference
groups as leaders adds another mechanism whereby individual-
level variation can be translated into group-level behavioral
differences.
I also found that heterogeneous groups created a special role
for unanimity in decision-making, especially in relatively low-
noise environments. When private information is of high quality
(low noise), individuals would ordinarily tend to follow this infor-
mation rather than attend to the choices of others, unless pref-
erence alignment is extremely high. However, in groups where
some individuals have near-identical preferences, the existence
of a consensus among previous decision makers can convince the
focal individual to follow this consensus quite strongly (thus also
reinforcing the consensus). Not only does this provide a mech-
anism for generating surprising degrees of consensus in groups
that may have a low degree of average preference alignment, it
also makes any deviation from that consensus especially power-
ful. Such a deviation from previous unanimity “breaks the spell”
and drives further decision makers back to trusting their own
private information.
It is important to reiterate that the model developed in this
paper considers only the information value of other agents’ deci-
sions. Aggregation may also carry intrinsic benefits (42), such a
predation dilution (4), mate availability, and temperature regula-
tion (43). Conversely, competition between agents for localized
resources may discourage aggregation (44, 45). These additional
factors complicate the identification of social information use in
real animals, especially in the wild (46). Nonetheless, the results
here suggest concrete predictions regarding collective behavior:
1) stronger social interactions between individuals with simi-
lar preferences, 2) greater aggregation in noisy environments,
3) stronger salience of recent social information in the pres-
ence of uncertainty, and 4) a correlation between leadership and
minority types in heterogeneous groups. These predictions are
potentially testable both through comparative analysis in wild
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populations and through intervention studies in the laboratory,
especially using artificial conspecifics (47–49) [although bearing
in mind the prediction that social responses may be systemat-
ically stronger under laboratory conditions (3)]. The effect of
genuinely differing preferences (as opposed to differing informa-
tion) on collective decision-making has received relatively little
experimental attention. The results in this paper show how future
work may test whether any such effects are based on rational
individual decision-making principles.
Materials and Methods
Utility Functions. I assume that any two possible choices can be distinguished
by a set of values, x1, x2, . . . xn, characterizing the difference between the
options across a set of independent factors. I further assume that the utility
difference, Uk, between the two options for any individual k is a weighted
sum over these values,
Uk =
n∑
i=1
αi,kxi , [3]
where the αi,k are the weighting coefficients for individual k and thus
specify their utility function.
I assume that individuals are familiar with making decisions within a
habitual environment and thus with the general properties of how the
factors x1, . . . , xn vary between decisions. I further assume, without loss of
generality, that each factor xi is measured on a standard scale, with mean
zero and unit variance. Therefore, if the number of factors is large, or if the
factors are themselves normally distributed, the prior distribution over the
utility difference for individual k follows a normal distribution,
p(Uk)∝φ
 Uk√∑n
i=1 α
2
i,k
, [4]
where φ(·) is the standard normal probability density function. Although
individuals may have differing utility functions, I assume that these operate
on the same scale, which I set, without loss of generality, to one. This is
equivalent to specifying that
∑n
i=1 α
2
i,k = 1 for all k, and therefore I retrieve
the same prior distribution over utility differences as specified in ref. 3,
p(Uk) =φ(Uk). [5]
Through this definition of the utility function, one can also specify the
joint distribution of utilities for multiple agents as a multivariate normal
distributionN (·, ·, ·),
p(U1,U2, . . .UN) =N (U, 0,Σ), [6]
where U = [U1, . . . ,UN]>, and
Σ=

1 ρ1,2 . . . ρ1,N
ρN,1
. . .
...
... ρN−1,N
ρN,1 . . . ρN,N−1 1
,
with ρk,l being the correlation between any two utility functions: ρk,l =∑n
i=1 αi,kαi,l. At this point, I introduce the concept of an undifferentiated
population. In such a population, I assume that all pairs of agents are equally
aligned in their preferences, averaged over possible choice characteristics xi ,
which corresponds to setting ρk,l = ρ for all pairs k, l. This corresponds to a
social environment in which agents know that others have somewhat dif-
fering preferences, and know the general degree of overlap between those
preferences and their own, but do not keep track of which individuals may
be more or less closely aligned to themselves.
Private Information. Each agent receives private information about the val-
ues of xi from the environment, for example, through physical sensory
mechanisms. This information is assumed to be imperfect, and corrupted
by noise residuals νi,k which are independent between individuals and
between factors, such that the measured value of xi , denoted as xˆi , takes
the form
xˆi,k = xi + νi,k. [7]
For convenience, I define a “privately estimated utility” for agent k, Uˆk,
Uˆk =
n∑
i=1
αi,k xˆi,k =Uk +
n∑
i=1
αi,kνi,k. [8]
Defining  as the environmental noise level relative to the scale of utilities,
with E(νi,k) = 0 and var(νi,k) = 2, one can therefore specify the conditional
probability distribution of the privately estimated utility for agent k,
p(Uˆk |Uk) =φ((Uˆk −Uk)/), [9]
where I assume that  is the same for all agents (i.e., agents are homoge-
neous in their sensory sensitivity). Taken alongside Eq. 6, this implies that
the true and privately estimated utilities for all agents are jointly normally
distributed, with
cov(Uk,Ul) = cov(Uˆk,Ul) = ρ+ δk,l(1− ρ)
cov(Uˆk, Uˆl) = ρ+ δk,l(1 + 
2− ρ),
[10]
where δk,l is the Kronecker delta function.
In the case of the first individual to make a decision, their belief about
the relative utilities of the two options is entirely determined by the
combination of their prior expectations and their private information,
p(U1 | Uˆ1)∝φ(U1)φ((Uˆ1−U1)/). [11]
This implies that the first individual will choose option A if and only if
Uˆ1 > 0.
Social Information. Having observed the decision made by the first individ-
ual, C1, the second decision maker must combine this social information
with their private information (Uˆ2) to update their belief over the relative
utilities based on their own preferences, U2. Recalling that the true and pri-
vately estimated utilities of all agents are jointly normally distributed, the
second individual’s beliefs are updated as
p(U2 | Uˆ2, C1)∝ P(U2 | Uˆ2)P(C1 |U2)
∝φ(U2)φ((Uˆ2−U2)/)Φ(U2C1ρ/
√
1 + 2− ρ2)
. [12]
This belief over U2 further implies a critical value of the privately estimated
utility, Uˆ2* such that
E(U2 | Uˆ2*, C1) = 0. [13]
If Uˆ2 > Uˆ2*, then the second individual will choose option A; otherwise, they
will choose option B.
Further Decisions. The third decision maker can observe the social informa-
tion from the first decision available to the second agent. Since I assume
that agents are undifferentiated and share a common pairwise preference
alignment ρ, the third decision maker can also determine the critical value
Uˆ∗2 that is calculated by the second individual as above. Having observed the
second decision, they are therefore able to determine whether the privately
estimated utility of individual 2 is greater or less than this critical value. The
third individual should then combine their own private information, sum-
marized by their privately estimated utility Uˆ3, with the knowledge they
have of the bounds on what individuals 1 and 2 have observed. For exam-
ple, if the third individual observes the first decision in favor of option A and
the second observes in favor of option B, they should update their belief as
follows:
P(U3|Uˆ3, C1 = 1, C2 =−1)
∝ P(U3 | Uˆ3)P(C1 = 1, C2 =−1 |U3)
∝φ(U3)φ((Uˆ3−U3)/)×∫ Uˆ2*
−∞
∫ ∞
0
N
([
Uˆ1
Uˆ2
]
, ρ
[
U3
U3
]
,
[
1 + 2 ρ− ρ2
ρ− ρ2 1 + 2
])
dUˆ1dUˆ2
. [14]
This updated belief structure further specifies a critical value Uˆ3* such
that E(U3|Uˆ3*, C1 = 1, C2 =−1) = 0. Subsequent agents can thus determine
a bound on Uˆ3 from the choice of individual 3, and this process can
be followed recursively in turn for each further decision maker, with the
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limits of integration chosen based on whether each individual chose option
A or B.
Observation. In common with the model described in ref. 3, I consider the
perspective of an external observer recording the decisions individual agents
make. This observer may record decisions in a natural environment, where
the noise level is the same as the habitual environmental noise, . However,
they may also record decisions under laboratory conditions that differ from
those in the wild. Therefore, I define an experimental noise level, η. Low
values of η/ indicate that the laboratory is much less noisy than the natural
environment, which is likely a common feature of behavioral experiments
where the many environmental stimuli are removed or simplified so as to
focus on the social response. An agent that continues to apply a decision-
making rule based on the habitual noise level will calculate a critical value
of the privately estimated utility as above. However, the probability that
the actual privately estimated utility that the agent receives will exceed this
critical value (which ultimately determines behavior) actually depends on
the experimental noise level,
P(Uˆi > Uˆi* |Ui , η) =φ
(
(Ui − Uˆi*)/η
)
. [15]
Populations with Cryptic Subtypes. So far, I have considered groups of
undifferentiated individuals, making the approximation that every pair of
individuals has the same degree of preference alignment. Now I consider
groups drawn from a population in which there are two cryptic subtypes:
Individuals have a strong preference alignment with those of the same sub-
type but a weak preference alignment with those of the other type. That
these subtypes are cryptic implies that the focal decision maker is not aware
of the specific type identities of previous decision makers, only the overall
prevalence of the two types in the population.
Consider a population composed of two types, α and β, and let γ be the
proportion of the population that is of type α. I assume that individuals
of the same type have a preference alignment of ρα,α = ρβ,β = ρhigh, while
those of different types have ρα,β = ρlow, with ρlow <ρhigh. If the focal deci-
sion maker can determine the types of the previous decision makers, then it
can apply the model previously described, but with an adapted covariance
between different individuals,
cov(Uk,Ul) =
{
ρhigh, if k, l same type
ρlow, if k, l different types.
[16]
To determine its own utility belief function, a focal decision maker must
evaluate the probability that the observed decisions were made, based on
each possible sequence, s, of types among previous decision makers, and
weight these by their relative probabilities,
p(Uk | Uˆk, C1, . . . Ck−1)∝ p(Uk | Uˆk)
∑
s∈S
P(C1, . . . Ck−1 |Uk, s)P(s), [17]
where S represents all possible sequences of individual types, and P(s) =
γnα (1− γ)nβ , with nα and nβ being the number of individuals of each type
in the sequence s.
This process can be carried out recursively as for the undifferentiated
population, with the focal agent calculating a different critical value of Uˆj*
for a previous decision maker j depending on whether that agent was type
α or β in a given putative sequence. Since the types of each individual are
cryptic, the focal agent knows that other individuals are also ignorant of the
types of the earlier decision makers.
Code Availability. Code to reproduce the results of this paper in R is included
as Dataset S1.
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